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Saturday, May 17, 2008

The Political and Military Situation in Sri Lanka  

by Tejal Chandan

Summary


The conflict in Sri Lanka, which has claimed over 70, 000 lives over the past two and half decades, has entered a difficult phase with the onset of 2008. The abrogation of the almost six year old Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) in January confirmed the intensified character of the battle in the coming months and the urgency of a political solution. Since then several military and political developments in the country have had varied reactions from different quarters both within Sri Lanka as well as internationally. This edition of the Security Watch discusses the various developments since the onset of 2008 and provides an analysis of their implications. While the Government is engaged in a battle with the LTTE, it has to live up to the expectations of restoring democratic rights and development in the erstwhile LTTE strongholds. Elections will have to be followed by considerable devolution of powers to the Provinces. The capability of the LTTE to infiltrate into Government held areas, more so, into Colombo is of serious concern. Inhuman acts of targeting civilians with several blasts, like the incident of May 16, will continue to shake the island nation.

Introduction

When the New Year dawned in Sri Lanka, it marked the onset of a difficult year for the Government and its strategies in bringing an end to the conflict. The abrogation of the almost six year old Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) in January confirmed the intensified character of the battle in the coming months and the urgency of a political solution. Thereafter, the submission of an interim report by the APRC, the increasing military thrust in the North and the elections in the Eastern Province have all had varied reactions from different quarters both within Sri Lanka as well as internationally. The first-ever election to the Eastern Provincial Council with a record number of 1342 candidates from 18 political parties and 73 independent groups is expected to put to test the theory that elections and the limited devolution that follows will meet the aspirations of the minorities.

The APRC Interim Report and the 13th Amendment


With fears of increased violence after the abrogation of the CFA, international pressure on the Government to expedite the process of finding a political solution grew enormously. The hopes of the APRC process delivering a solution acceptable to all quarters of the Sri Lankan polity seemed rather slim without the participation of the two largest opposition parties that quit the process on different accounts. The sudden environment of urgency created after the abrogation of the CFA led the APRC to submit an interim report to the Sri Lankan President. Pending consensus among all the parties on further amendments to the Constitution, the report recommended the full and faithful implementation of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, holding Provincial Council elections in the East and the establishment of an Interim Provincial Council for the North. The implementation of the 13th Amendment continues to evoke a divided opinion among the Sri Lankan polity. Critics have argued that it is the inability of successive Governments to implement the Amendment that has kept the conflict alive. The process of implementation of the 13th Amendment, which has been part of the statute for over 20 years, could have been embarked upon by the present Government without the recommendations of the APRC but the Sri Lankan President insists that the report was necessary to ensure the 'consensus' that was lacking during the Governments of his predecessors. In a way, President Mahinda Rajapakse silenced the opposition from the UNP (United National Party) as it was the UNP President J.R. Jayewardene's Government that passed the amendment in 1987. As for the international community, it has for several years been insisting on the implementation of the Amendment and thus there was little to argue over the interim report.

Looking at the fine print, the APRC Interim Report recommends less than what was passed in 1987. The Committee in a four page report titled "Action to be Taken by the President to Fully Implement Relevant Provisions of the Present Constitution as a Prelude to the APRC Proposals" recommended measures that can be taken under the existing provisions of the Constitution. The temporary merger of the North and East which was the basic feature of the 13th Amendment was undone by a Supreme Court ruling that declared the merger illegal. Hence, the recommendations of the interim report are bereft of this basic feature. Again as envisaged in the amendment, the powers of finances, police, education and land are not to be devolved. On the issue of the Official Language, the interim report recommended immediate action for the full implementation of "Chapter IV- Language" of the Constitution. The Head of the APRC panel, Tissa Vitharana, has said that while a consensus document, which would be a basis for an appropriate constitutional arrangement, is being finalized, a course of action to achieve maximum and effective devolution of powers to the Provinces in the short term has been identified.

Until the APRC's own final proposals concretize, the implementation of the Interim Report is a pragmatic "first step" towards the prospect of a just political solution. President Mahinda Rajapakse and the SLFP (Sri Lanka Freedom Party) have shown progress in accepting the implementation of the 13th Amendment as against the SLFP proposals of May 2007 that proposed devolution at the district level. The challenge is in maintaining the support for genuinely implementing the provisions of the 13th Amendment. In keeping with the recommendations of the APRC to constitute an Interim Provincial Council for the North, the Government set up a Special Task Force (STF) for the Northern Province to oversee development initiatives. The STF will provide advice to all ministries, departments and statutory bodies of the state and will help coordinate and oversee resettlement and rehabilitation work, facilitate coordination between Executive and Consultative board as proposed by the APRC and provide proposals and ideas to the Governor of the Northern Province. The three-member STF will be headed by the Cabinet Minister for Social Services, Douglas Devananda and comprise the Minister for Rehabilitation, Rishad Badiuddin and senior Presidential Advisor and MP, Basil Rajapakse.

Elections and the Political Scenario

Emboldened by victories on the battlefield, the Sri Lankan Government was keen on holding elections in the East. The decision to hold local council elections in the Batticaloa district was strongly contested by the key opposition parties including the UNP, TNA (Tamil National Alliance) and JVP (Janatha Vimukti Perumuna) on the grounds that conditions in the Eastern Province were not suitable for free and fair elections and the Government had failed to disarm the TMVP (TamilEela Makkal Vidhuthalai Pulikal). Nevertheless, the local council elections were held on March 10 in a peaceful environment and proved to be a success for the Government in more ways than one. The Government could now take the credit for bringing the breakaway faction of the LTTE into the political mainstream. It is said that the main purpose of these elections was to legitimize the TMVP as a political party. To the international community the elections were meant to prove the government's determination to usher in democracy in the formerly LTTE dominated areas. The TMVP won eight of the nine local body elections but the result was no surprise as the UNP, TNA and JVP decided not to contest.

This set the backdrop for the Provincial Council elections held on May 10. The run-up to the Eastern Provincial Council elections saw the opposing political parties gradually join the fray. The UNP aligned with the SLMC (Sri Lanka Muslim Congress) which is the strongest Muslim political party in the East and the ruling UPFA (United Peoples Freedom Alliance) coalition aligned with the TMVP. The TNA did not contest, as running in the election would amount to recognition of the demerger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces. However, its appeal to voters to defeat the Government was construed as supporting the UNP-SLMC alliance. For the Mahinda Rajapakse led government this election had several larger objectives and higher stakes. Successful elections in the East would consolidate the separation of the East and North. Further, these elections will assuage the international community's concerns over the lack of a political solution. Interestingly, at a Seminar in Colombo, a Government Minister went so far as saying that a defeat for the Government in the elections would be an even bigger success as the Government would have proved that the conduct of the election was free and fair. Alternatively, it can also be said that an electoral defeat for the government would have meant that the people disapproved of the military strategy.

The May 10 elections had a 60 percent turnout and passed off without any major incident of violence amid unprecedented security measures. President Mahinda Rajapakse's UPFA won the elections and within hours, the President declared that the people had "given a clear mandate for peace through the defeat of terrorism, strengthening of democracy and development of the country" An important underlying message from the victory is the legitimization of the Government's strategy to militarily eliminate the LTTE. The elections were not bereft of controversies. The opposition parties refused to accept the results and questioned the free and fair character of the elections. Election monitoring groups have argued that although there were no major incidents of violence there were undercurrents of intimidation all through the election campaigning. On the day of the election, there were reports of large-scale impersonations and intimidations.

The most controversial aspect of the elections has been the fact that the TMVP continues to retain arms on the grounds of self-defence. The PAFFREL (People's Action for Free and Fair Elections) Election Monitoring Report has rightly noted that "The basic requirement for a free and fair election is that all the contesting parties are unarmed and not in a position to intimidate both their political rivals as well as voters who will be fearful to cross the path of the armed party."[1] Adding to this problem was the fact that the TMVP was aligned with the Government which jeopardized the system of checks and balances on electoral malpractices. While the debate of fair or unfair will continue to preoccupy Sri Lankans, the Government will soon have to forge its success with the devolution of powers and development of the Eastern Province. The Eastern Province has seen no development since the 1980s when its agriculture, fisheries, industry and infrastructure were destroyed by the LTTE. The Government has given top priority to economic development in the province by allocating USD 56 million for the purpose. Although several development projects have been initiated, equal attention has to be given to reconstruction and rehabilitation projects. An important decision for Mahinda Rajapakse was the choice of a Chief Minister. The Eastern Province has an evenly balanced Tamil, Sinhala and Muslim population. Pillaiyan (Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan), leader of the TMVP, has secured the maximum number of preferential votes followed by M.L.A.M. Hisbullah who defected from the SLMC and is a UPFA ally. On May 16, Pillaiyan was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the Eastern Province but Hisbullah along with two other elected Muslim members decided not to support the appointed Chief Minister. The Hindu Editorial of May 13, 2008 had suggested that given the current and past tensions "a sound and progressive course will be to go for a rotating arrangement in which the Chief Ministership will be shared by the Muslim and Tamil Groups that have done well at the polls." The President has sought to resolve this tussle by appointing a Muslim candidate as Chairman of the Eastern Province. There are also indications that Muslims would get most of the ministerial portfolios.

Military Thrust in the North


The top priority of the Sri Lankan military forces has been the military weakening of the guerillas and recapturing of their heartland in the Wanni. Since July last year, the security forces have faced stiff resistance from LTTE owing to increased guerilla strength in the areas around the Northern Forward Defence Lines (FDLs). The military, however, is said to be carrying out three different thrusts into the rebel-held strongholds. The first thrust from Mannar led to the capture of the Sea Tiger base of Vidutaltiva which acquired added significance for the guerillas since the army recaptured Silavathurai. The second thrust from Muhamalai, southwards in the direction of Killinochchi, has maintained pressure on the guerillas with troops making incursions to attack guerilla defences and returning to their positions. The third thrust from the eastern side from Vavuniya has led to advances into the rebel stronghold from defence lines at Weli Oya. In the past, whenever the LTTE has faced pressure in the battlefields in the North and East, they have taken the battle outside the region and this time around also, it is not any different. With the CFA abrogated and the SLMM packed away, the LTTE had no qualms in openly targeting civilians outside the theatre of conflict. Attacks into the deep South have proven this tactic of the guerillas. An added concern for the security forces is the increased LTTE activity in the Central Province.

Further, with the elections in the East, the war assumed a new dimension. According to Sunday Times Defence Correspondent Iqbal Athas "Particularly in the Mannar sector, the re-capture of the Madhu shrine and its environs by the troops will bolster the ruling party's position at the polls. It could be argued, perhaps with some justification, that after re-capturing the East, troops were now making gains in the North. For the same reason, Tiger guerrillas would want to avoid loss of any territory dominated by them. They would want to offer stronger resistance at least until the polls are over."[2] While the security forces have continued to maintain pressure on the LTTE in the North from Mannar and Vavuniya, the FDLs from Kilaly to Nager Kovil in the Jaffna Peninsula have come under LTTE attack. The Muhamalai FDL came under a fierce attack by the LTTE on April 23. The attack, which was an attempt to infiltrate into government controlled areas claimed the lives of several Sri Lankan soldiers. According to Keheliya Rambukwella, Defence Spokesperson, 43 soldiers were killed and 33 were missing in action. A further 126 were injured. Contrastingly, Army Chief Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka disclosed that over 300 soldiers were wounded. He also mentioned that the Army had advanced by 600 metres ahead of the original FDL. It has to be noted here that only 16 days ahead of this attack several media personnel were taken on a tour to leave no doubt about the formidable defensive positions in Muhamalai. Another aspect is that besides the loss of life, the loss of military hardware can prove to be very costly. The intensity of the attack can be gauged by the request for aerial support by the Army Headquarters. The security sorces have nevertheless been able to spring back into action and make slow but further incursions into enemy defence lines. The Sri Lankan troops are now in control of the sacred Madhu Church which is of great religious significance. The capabilities of the Tigers to infiltrate into Government held areas remains, as demonstrated by their under water operation that sank a Sri Lankan Naval troop and munitions vessel in Trincomalee Harbour just hours before the Provincial Council Elections. Overall, compared to the battles in the East, there are indications that the military offensive in the North has slowed down and that the military is following a Strategy of Attrition in the Wanni. This implies large scale use of mortars, guns and helicopter gunships with obvious consequences for civilians.

There have been several doubts raised on the issue of casualties in the battle. Iqbal Athas says that "If you add up all the figures given by the government from the beginning of the separatist war until now, it would have wiped out the population of the North twice over. Similarly if one were to adopt the figures put out by the Tamil Tiger rebels that would have depleted the ranks of the military considerably". The Government's Media Centre for National Security says that since the onset of 2006, 6867 Tiger fighters and 1501 Sri Lankan soldiers have been killed. Of the rebel losses, just over 2000 have taken place this year up to March 19 and the armed forces losses for the same period have been 186. According to Military Spokesman, Brig. Udaya Nanayakkara, the Tigers were down to around 5-6000 fighters at the beginning of this year from an estimated 12000. Interestingly, Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka has at different occasions contradicted his own statements on the strength of the LTTE and the timeframe for defeating them. In December last year he was quoted as saying "My term of office is coming to an end this year and I will not leave this war to the succeeding army commander". Then in January he said that "LTTE has 3000 cadres remaining. Military plans to kill them within six months". In February again he said "I don't conduct the war looking at deadlines and timeframes. The LTTE has around 5000 fighters… We must realize that the offensive is going to take time". President Mahinda Rajapakse has also said that in a year or two the security forces might be able to clear the LTTE out of the remaining areas. When one looks at the area reclaimed by the security forces in the North, the progress has been slow as compared to the easy capture of large swathes of land in the East and the casualties reported from the battle in the North seem to be higher. It is unclear as to how timeframes can be set for a war of such uncertain nature. The doubts over the number of casualties are cast also due to the fact that journalists are barred from conflict areas and they have no independent means to verify the figures given to them by the Government or those mentioned on Tamil Tiger websites. To maintain high morale among the security forces and to sustain an aura of confidence seen as necessary to maintain the support of the majority ethnic group that is dominant in the South, it is suspected that the casualty figures may be quite different from the actuals.

The Issue of Human Rights

The International Independent Group of Eminent Persons (IIGEP) which was constituted by the Sri Lankan President in February 2007 (to monitor the work of the Commission of Inquiry (COI) appointed to inquire into 16 incidents of alleged serious violations of human rights since August 1, 2005) terminated its operations in the island in March.[3] The IIGEP was to comment on the transparency of the COI's investigations and their conformity with international norms and standards. However, since its formation relations between the Government and the IIGEP deteriorated to an extent where both developed distrust of the other's intentions. The IIGEP in its public statement on the termination of operations noted that "the proceedings of inquiry and investigation have fallen far short of the transparency and compliance with basic international norms and standards pertaining to investigations and inquiries. The IIGEP has time and again pointed out the major flaws of the process: first and foremost, the conflict of interest at all levels, in particular with regard to the role of the Attorney General's Department. Additional flaws include the restrictions on the operation of the Commission through lack of proper funding and independent support staff; poor organisation of the hearings and lines of questioning; refusal of the State authorities at the highest level to fully cooperate with the investigations and inquiries; and the absence of an effective and comprehensive system of witness protection." Justice P.N. Bhagwati, head of the IIGEP, further said that "There has been and continues to be a lack of political and institutional will to investigate and inquire into the cases before the Commission". The IIGEP statement further noted that it had submitted substantial suggestions and observations in several interim reports to the President but these were ignored and rejected.

In response to this statement, the Attorney General said that the IIGEP seeks to cater for an international agenda in releasing the Public Statements to coincide with the 7th Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council. The Government has time and again charged the Group with pursuing an agenda tailored for external forces while harping on the lack of political will. The Public Statement noted that "IIGEP does not see how its continued engagement with the process could change this situation. The Eminent Persons hope, nevertheless, that their concluding observations and recommendations will assist the Commission of Inquiry and the Government of Sri Lanka". The Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights has noted that although the members of the IIGEP have relinquished their mandate, the concept of the IIGEP has not been dispensed with. The Government will exercise its right to appoint other experts who will be able to discharge the mandate given to the IIGEP. The outlook towards the international community in Sri Lanka needs to be underlined here. Foreign Secretary Palitha Kohana in an interview to The New York Times stated that Sri Lanka's "traditional donors", namely, the U.S., Canada and the E.U., had been replaced by countries in the East because the new donors are neighbours; they are rich; and they conduct themselves differently. He further stated that "Asians don't go around teaching each other how to behave." This increasingly anti-West worldview and a push towards building relations with China, Pakistan and Iran is a worrying aspect for the international community.

In another human rights controversy, the Sri Lankan military has been accused of abductions by the New York based Human Rights Watch (HRW) in its report released on March 6. The report said that it found the Government forces involved in 99 cases of abductions documented by the HRW. It further mentioned that most of them taken were Tamils with alleged ties to the rebels along with journalists, clergy, educators and human rights workers. The Government has however denied any involvement of the military in abductions. Separately, the University Teachers for Human Rights of Jaffna (UTHR) in it's special report No. 28 made public in December 2007 outlined the hardships of the people in Jaffna and made a scathing indictment on the armed forces, government and LTTE on the count of human rights. Random killings, extra-judicial torture and disappearances have become a norm in Jaffna and NGOs stay away from the touchy issue of human rights as it invariably leads to a confrontation with the Government and poses a problem to their ability to function in the area. Among other issues of serious concern, according to the report, are the signs that civilians have lost all right to dignity. In the case of the LTTE, it says that rights groups have not got around to seeing the practices of the Tigers who are said to maintain a register of children who are abducted as soon as they turn 17. The prevailing pressure maintained by the security forces in the battlefield has led to the LTTE increasingly conscripting women and children to fight in the frontlines. A UN report of January has said that the renegade outfit of the LTTE (Karuna Faction) continues to recruit children for combat purposes. A more worrying aspect is that these recruitments have been made from the Internally Displaced Persons camps. The issue of the large number of IDPs should be a cause of concern for the Government. The lack of security around refugee camps and IDP camps and the concentration of vulnerable children make these camps prime recruiting grounds.

Conclusion

The different facets of the conflict described above indicate that a difficult year lies ahead for the Government of Sri Lanka. While it is engaged in a battle with the LTTE, it has to live up to the expectations of restoring democratic rights and development in the erstwhile LTTE strongholds. Elections will have to be followed by considerable devolution of powers to the Provinces and the government will also have to respect the rights of the opposition and accommodate its legitimate demands. The considerable efforts of holding elections and devolving of power would be meaningless if an environment of fear and intimidation continues in the former battleground. The capability of the LTTE to infiltrate into Government held areas, more so, into Colombo is of serious concern. Inhuman acts of targeting civilians with several blasts, like the incident of May 16, will continue to take place and shake the island nation.


[1] PAFFREL Interim Election Monitoring Report, May 10, 2008
URL: http://www.paffrel.lk/pdf/paffrel_interim_report_10_may_08.pdf
[2] Iqbal Athas, Situation Report, The Sunday Times, 20th April, 2008
[3] B. Murlidhar Reddy, "Mission Failure", Frontline, Vol.25. Issue 7, March 29-April11, 2008.

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