Security Watch

Summary:

A year after the offensive began in the North of the country, the 'Peace through War' strategy continues in the North. The Tigers have lost the capability of fighting a conventional war but retain the ability to mount sporadic terrorist attacks. In the present situation, the LTTE does not seem to agree on disarming and neither is the Government inclined to halting the military operations. This issue of Security Watch takes stock of military operations in the North and discusses the situation of human rights, specifically media freedom and the state of the country's economy and its correlation with the war. Tens of thousands of civilians in the entire LTTE controlled territory are being displaced and humanitarian agencies are unable to cope with the demands for more aid. A sharp rise in the number of attacks on journalists is giving credence to the widespread feeling that Sri Lanka has a serious human rights problem. The Sri Lankan economy has grown at 6 percent for the past three years in the midst of the war but is this growth real or 'phantom'? In the current phase military successes are sustaining the public support in spite of a high cost of living. The Government claims that the people have to pay this cost in order to eradicate terrorism and the people are buying this argument. Much of the public support depends on being able to sustain these successes well into the heartland of the LTTE held territory. The Sri Lankan forces are fighting attrition warfare, which will stretch the war over a long period, and Army Chief Gen. Fonseka has admitted that a low-level insurgency could last indefinitely.

In the present situation, the LTTE does not seem agreeable on disarming and neither is the Government inclined to halt the military operations. In addition a poll by the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) in March 2008 has shown that a majority of the Sinhalese support the war with only a marginal 16 percent in support of negotiations. Contrary to the common belief that a rising cost of living would reduce support for government policies- in this case the military offensive- the CPA poll shows that support for negotiations has reduced. The long-drawn out war is continuing to the detriment of other essential issues such as basic human rights, the economy and the well being of the citizens.

Military Operations: The Northern Front

The present military offensive in the North began in July 2007. The two theaters of operations include Jaffna and the Wanni. The Army initially deployed 2 divisions and a Task Force to lead the offensives on three fronts in the Wanni namely: Mannar, Vavuniya and Welioya. With the progress of the battle, the Army increased its strength up to four divisions and two Task Forces.

The Fall of Mannar

In the Mannar sector, the SL Army was within six- seven kilometers of the Madhu Church in the beginning of the year. Troops advanced into the district on two different flanks, one west and the other east of the Giant's Tank. Most of the battles in this sector have been largely through the exchange of artillery and mortar fire and the advancing troops have had to clear improvised mines and other explosive devices. Although the advances were initially slow, perhaps almost static, the forces captured key LTTE bases in Mannar. The area around Madhu Church was captured in April followed by LTTE's One-Eight Base in Kallikulam. Two major LTTE bastions in Mannar- Adampan and Palampiddy-were captured in May. The area surrounding Periyamadu fell in June. Another LTTE stronghold, Parappakkadantan, also fell in June. With this capture, the Sri Lankan Army claimed to have cleared some of the most fertile regions in Mannar district, also known as the "Rice Bowl", including a total of 18 villages. The two divisions that were moving North from the East and West flanks of the Giant's Tank merged and moved towards Vidattaltivu. The capture of the Sea Tiger Base in Vidattaltivu and an LTTE military base further North in Illuppaikaddavali in July were one of the major successes for the Army. After the capture of Silvathurai Sea Tiger Base in October 2007, Vidattaltivu had become a landing point for military and medical supplies for the guerillas from across the Gulf of Mannar and its loss is a major set back for them. Moving further northwards, the Army claimed to have liberated the entire Mannar district by capturing LTTE's last bastion in the district, Vellankulam on August 2. Operations have now shifted to Kilinochchi district and the Army is focusing on capturing the A-32 highway and other Sea Tiger bases in the district in order to deny sea access to the rebels. Equally important is closing in on the A9 highway and troops have penetrated rebel defences in Tunukkai and Uyilankulam. In early September the rebel town of Mallavi was captured taking the SL Forces closer the strategic A9 highway.

Map showing Giant's Tank and ' Rice Bowl' area
Source: Daily Mirror Sri Lanka

Map showing Vellankulam, last LTTE bastion in Mannar. The shaded part shows area under the control of LTTE as of the last week of July 2008. The Army has been able to advance further North since then. Source- Daily Mirror, Sri Lanka

The Thrust from Vavuniya

In Vavuniya district, the Army was able to penetrate into the Vavuniya-Omanthai defences of the LTTE in February. Since then Army divisions have moved ahead in the Eastern and Northern direction towards Mankulam. In July the Army progressed north of Vavunikulam after capturing the village of Navvi. In the Welioya sector North of Janakapura, the Army captured large areas of no man's land since the beginning of this year and troops have been advancing towards Mullaittivu. Some of the major successes came in the form of capturing key Tiger bases. In May the critical Munagam base was captured while troops carried out operations in some of the thickly forested areas. Advancing further the Army captured the "Michael Base" in July. On August 18 the troops captured another base called 'Jeewan' in Andankulam. As the troops progress further into the jungles, more rebel bases are expected to be captured.

Impregnable Muhamalai

In the Jaffna Front, the Army has tried to break into the rebel defences south of Muhamalai entry-exit point but has not been successful in moving southwards. The Government and the media have had different versions of the fighting in Muhamalai. According to the Sri Lankan Defence Ministry, the Muhamalai FDLs (forward defence lines) came under attack in April 2008 from the LTTE who attempted to infiltrate into Government controlled areas in the North. But the Army thwarted the attack. On the other hand, according to the Sunday Times the Army launched an offensive operation in the region to thrust southwards. The Sri Lankan defences in Jaffna stretch from Kilali to Muhamalai to Nagarkovil spanning around eight kilometers. The offensive southwards was attempted along this eight kilometer stretch. The Tigers have been able to thwart their advance and the SL Forces are said have suffered severe losses even in two of the previous southward thrusts in October 2006 and November 2007.

Air and Sea Power

Throughout the military operations, the role of the SL Air Force has been crucial to the Army's advance. The Air Force pounded rebel positions and ground movements were supported by helicopter gunships. Similarly, the Navy has been able to restrict the rebel movements at sea and has consolidated the capture of Sea Tiger bases. The LTTE at its end has claimed to have thwarted several advances by the Army and inflicted severe losses on the security forces. Such news has hardly found place in some of the mainstream Sri Lankan newspapers. There were no air strikes by the LTTE since April 2007, until recently, leading to speculation of the total destruction of its air capability. But attacks in late August this year on the Trincomalee Naval Base have revived concerns of LTTE air activity. Government officials suggest that the attack by the rebels was merely a propaganda tactic to boost the sagging morale of its cadres but what is more worrisome is their capability to penetrate Sri Lankan defences and escape once again. According to latest casualty reports from the Government, 5,859 rebels and 536 soldiers have lost their lives since January. There has always been a mismatch between the casualty figures put out by the Government and the LTTE and it has been difficult for journalists or researchers to independently verify the death toll on both sides.

Battlefront Progress in Sri Lanka

Areas in blue indicate SL Army advance and areas in red indicate LTTE strongholds
Source: Ministry of Defence, Sri Lanka, URL: http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20080623_02

A Long War

An important element of the Government's strategy needs to be noted. While earlier the Government sought to militarily weaken the LTTE to coerce its leaders to opt for a political solution, the present strategy seems to be one where there is no room for the LTTE in the politico-military equation. As articulated by the country's leaders, the strategy is not to merely 'grab land' but to go for the kill and remove the absolute enemy (LTTE). The thinking that peace will be impossible as long as this obstacle (LTTE) is not removed, has set in deeply in the psyche of not only the Government but also a majority of the Sri Lankan people. The victory of the coalition Government in the North-Central Provincial elections in August has been viewed as an endorsement of this strategy. Another interesting factor is the claim of finishing the war within a stipulated time period. While earlier, Sri Lankan leaders claimed to finish the war by 2008, now they claim it could take mid-2009. The Sri Lankan forces are fighting attrition warfare, which will stretch the war over a long period. One is reminded of Sun Tzu's writing on Waging War: "When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, the men's weapons will grow dull and their ardour will be dampened. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength, and if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the state will not be equal to the strain. Never forget: When your weapons are dulled, your ardour dampened, your strength exhausted, and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue."

Why the Offensive will be Difficult

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Janaka Perera, who has led Sri Lanka's previous attempts to break into LTTE defences, said in an interview to The Sunday Leader that although military offensives against the LTTE held Wanni started in July 2007, there has been little tangible progress until recently. He also said that the Government's self imposed deadlines were not realistic and questioned the veracity of massive claims of LTTE casualties made by the defense establishment. Noting that it would be a nightmare if the war drags on, he said that if the fighting spreads over a year, the soldier suffers from both mental fatigue and physical exhaustion. These factors combined with home problems are going to impact his quality of focus and in September with the north-east monsoon, the weather will add to the physical and mental exhaustion. This in turn will delay the progress and such delays work in the favour of the LTTE. Speaking on grounds of anonymity to the Sunday Times correspondent, Iqbal Athas, Army officials said that the unexpected enemy- incessant rains- had hampered offensive operations against the Wanni. In some areas, flood waters were knee-high and they faced an unexpected problem of soldiers falling sick due to dengue or malaria. These soldiers had to be hospitalized for treatment and could not serve on the fronts. Bad weather also meant that the crucial air activity, like surveillance, close air support, casualty evacuation, among others was being hampered. Besides roads were muddy and deployment of armoured vehicles was posing a problem.

Another problem faced by the Army is that of desertions. Low morale and suicides have been reported especially amongst young recruits in Jaffna. In June, the Government launched a campaign to track down 12,000 deserters who failed to take advantage of the government amnesty. Around 5000 are said to have returned during the month long amnesty in May. The government is now trying to get back the deserters by threatening criminal action. The SL Air Force has also announced that it is going to recruit 2500 commandos. The LTTE is also short of fighters. Having suffered heavy attrition since the war began and with the Sri Lankan forces closing in on their territory, the LTTE is on an urgent recruitment drive. Ex-cadres are undergoing re-training and around 1000 civilians have joined the People's Army (Makkal Padai). About 30 percent of the people conscripted by the LTTE this year have died. Most of them are boys and girls under the age of 17. According to a report by the UTHR-J (University Teachers of Human Rights- Jaffna) a boy or girl turning 17 and failing to report to the LTTE can expect press gangs at their door step within two or three days. Many of those dying on the frontlines are new conscripts according to the report.

LTTE Down But Not Out

The current phase of the conflict is decisive for both the LTTE and the Government Forces. The LTTE will fiercely defend its territory and the terrain is such that both the adversaries will take casualties. Successes in the battlefront have lent credibility to the Government's strategies. Much of the public support depends on the Army being able to sustain these successes well into the heartland of the LTTE held territory. In recent times the war has seen a change in tactics by both sides. The SL forces have adopted LTTE's hit and run tactics. In one such operation, an Army division made a foray into the LTTE' defences in Kilaly in Jaffna and claimed to withdraw after killing 15 LTTE cadres. These tactics have helped the Government conserve their men while depleting the enemy. Similarly the LTTE is said to be no longer withdrawing that easily and has replaced inexperienced cadres with their elite regiments. According to P. K. Balachandran, New Indian Express correspondent, the LTTE is counter attacking with a ferocity seen very rarely in the past two years. Currently, fighting continues in Kilinochchi, Vavuniya, Welioya and FDLs in Jaffna. Gen. Sarath Fonseka believes that the LTTE is weakened to such an extent that it will very soon lose control of its territory and the population. He no doubt exuded the confidence and motivation of his fighters but what is also noteworthy is that he admitted that a low-level insurgency could last indefinitely. While speaking to foreign news correspondents he said "Even if we finish the war, capture the whole of the north, still the LTTE might have some members joining them (as) there are people who believe in Tamil nationalism. The LTTE might survive another even two decades with about 1,000 cadres… but we will not be fighting in the same manner (having defeated the rebel group's conventional warfare capability).It might continue as an insurgency forever."

Humanitarian Situation and Media Freedom

Human rights violations continue with impunity in different parts of the country including Colombo according to the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka (NPC). The ongoing fighting in the North is displacing tens of thousands of civilians in the entire LTTE controlled territory who are fleeing from place to place. UN aid agencies have said that 1,12,000 people have been internally displaced in the months of June and July and the figure is expected to increase. Humanitarian agencies admit that they are unable to cope with the demand for emergency shelter, water and sanitation as a result of the growing displaced population. The capability of these agencies is affected in part due to the restrictions laid on them by the Government. The Government's stated concern is that humanitarian aid is being usurped by the LTTE to strengthen its war machine. It was also reported that LTTE is restricting the movement of even those civilians wounded in combat areas. Amnesty International's Yolanda Foster said that "the Tigers are keeping them (civilians) in harm's way and the government is not doing enough to ensure they receive essential assistance" She further said that "measures (adopted by the LTTE) seem designed to use civilians as a buffer against Government forces."

The dire situation of the civilians has recently prompted the Bishop of Mannar to request the Government to urgently permit UN and other NGOs to reach the affected population. He has also proposed the establishment of 'No-Conflict Zones' in each of the three districts in the North. The NPC has proposed the establishment of a humanitarian corridor with cooperation from UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross, whereby people who wish to leave the areas of combat are permitted by both the Government and the LTTE to do so in accordance with the basic human right of freedom of movement. This proposal echoed the concerns of the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Sri Lanka. He said that "if we are able to have continued access in terms of humanitarian supplies to these people, if there is safe space for the civilians in that area (North), if both sides respect their responsibility to allow displaced people to move where they want to move, then I think a crisis can be avoided." The current fighting in Kilinochchi has seen more civilians fleeing from their homes into LTTE held territory. The Government estimates that 1,75,000 people are currently in the city of Kilinochchi. Despite denials by the Government, civilians are being killed in air attacks and artillery fire and these civilian deaths are grist for LTTE's mill.

Free Media?

Besides the human suffering, intimidation of those who seek to be an independent voice in the Sri Lankan society seems to have become an unfortunate feature in the country. The impunity with which the media has been targeted in Sri Lanka for the past two years is giving credence to the widespread feeling that Sri Lanka has a serious human rights problem. Amidst a raging controversy over a set of guidelines issued by the Defence Ministry on the norms to be followed in reporting the ongoing war, there has been a sharp rise in the number of attacks on journalists. The Defence Ministry in an article on its website said that "the Ministry stands affirm on its stance over the irresponsible defence reportage and will assure to take all necessary measures to stop this journalistic treachery against the country… the Ministry finds that certain sections of media and political interlopers continue to mislead the public over the issue." The four main issues of concern in defence reportage for the Ministry include criticizing military operations, promotion schemes, procurement and using unethical measures to obtain defence information. The article further reads "whoever attempts to reduce the public support to the military by making false allegations and directing baseless criticism at armed forces personnel is supporting the terrorist organization that continuously murder citizens of Sri Lanka. The Ministry will continue to expose these traitors and their sinister motives and does not consider such exposure as a threat to media freedom. Those who commit such treachery should identify themselves with the LTTE rather than showing themselves as crusaders of media freedom."

According to Amnesty International, 12 Sri Lankan media persons were killed in the past two years. Free Media Movement (FMM), a Colombo based NGO concerned with the welfare of the media community, said that the "Government bars photographers, censors news from the war front and believes that the right of the public to know information and news related to the ongoing war is severely undermined by the restrictions placed on journalists. Both the LTTE and the Government do not allow independent media to cover the war in a manner that accurately reports, amongst other things, the numbers dead and injured." The killing of journalists from Jaffna further restricts the free flow of information from the war zones of the North. Contradictory statements by the Defence Ministry- condemning the media- and the Media Minister- assuring that it is not a government policy- may be taken by various groups as a further license to behave with impunity towards the media. Sunanda Deshapriya, Head of FMM says that in the wake of abductions, physical assault, torture and even murder, free media may cease to exist in Sri Lanka.

The Economy

The Sri Lankan economy has grown at 6 percent for the past three years in the midst of a war in the North, terror attacks in Colombo and other parts of the country and a high cost of living. On the face of it, this sustainable growth rate is unprecedented but it is imperative to discern the sources of such remarkable economic growth rate to find out whether the growth is real or 'phantom growth' as Muttukrishna Sarvananthan, from the Point Pedro Institute of Development calls it. He attributes one of the primary sources of economic growth in the past three years (2005-2007) to the growth in government services. "Wanton recruitment to the public sector has been the hallmark of the new government that came to power in April 2004. In 2006 and 2007 increasing recruitment to the armed forces (including to homeguard and civil defence force services) has bolstered the public sector." The increased number of personnel, he says, has increased expenditure for government services and not necessarily enhanced in productivity of personnel. Thus, the growth experienced is mostly unproductive growth or phantom growth.

Reports of the Sri Lankan Government facing a financial crunch have been rife. The Government has estimated its total revenues for the year 2008 at LKR 750 billion (USD 7 billion). Out of this LKR 580 billion (USD 5.4 billion) will be used for compulsory debt repayment and the remaining will be used for defence and civil security leaving no money for other social and developmental expenditure. Public expenditure on social sectors (education and health) and economic infrastructure (power, roads, transport and railways) was just 11% of the total in 2005 and 2006 according to Sarvananthan. The fact that such a large amount of revenue will be spent on repaying debts means that the government is spending more for the past than the future. Sri Lankan imports have increased by 37.6 percent in the first quarter of 2008 while exports have increased only by 10 percent. Thus, the trade deficit had gone up by 107.2 percent. The increased public expenditure is financed by both domestic and foreign borrowings, but of late the share of domestic borrowings in financing public expenditure has increased as a result of shrinking foreign aid. However, foreign grants have reduced not because of the war but because Sri Lanka has now been recognised as a middle income country. The economic crunch is compounded further by the surging world price of crude oil and international prices of rice and wheat. At the domestic front, unprecedented rain and floods have slashed the seasonal paddy harvest and other food crops. In such a situation the cost of living is likely to increase further. Faced with such a crisis can the Sri Lankan economy continue to fund another protracted phase of war?

Defence Expenditure

Coming back to the numbers, defence expenditure in Sri Lanka has been rising since 2006 and has always over shot the budgeted expenditure. According to Dr. Saravananthan, in 2008, the Government expects to spend LKR 456 million (USD 0.4 million) per day on defence and public security. This figure is however, an underestimation because lot of the armament purchases are made on instalment basis. Therefore payments are spread for a number of years in the future with accrued interest. Since most of this expenditure is going to be financed by domestic and external borrowings the cost of interest payments in the future years has to be included. All of this would mean that the compounded cost of defence expenditures would be significantly greater than that shown in the annual budget outlays. Sri Lanka has been the highest defence spender in South Asia and among other internal conflict ridden countries both in terms of per capita and as a percentage of the GDP. According to the SIPRI military expenditure database, among developing countries and/or countries affected by civil war, Sri Lanka's military expenditure as a percentage of its GDP is highest after Eritrea (25%) and Israel (8%). High defence expenditure can also be advantageous to the economy but such advantages accrue only to countries that have a military industrial complex/ defence industry. In the case of Sri Lanka all defence procurements are imported and thus currency exchange rates have an enormous impact on the budgeted amount.

Sri Lanka's Direct Defence Expenditure 2006-2008

Note: Actual defence expenditure and GDP for 2008 are estimates assuming 6% growth

Apart from direct costs related to the defence expenditure one has to also take stock of the indirect costs. The war has led to a loss of tourism earnings and local and foreign investment. In terms of earnings per capita, there is a loss of future earnings of dead and disabled combatants and civilians. Besides, a high military expenditure diverts public money from more productive expenditure and social sectors as mentioned earlier. Increasing military checkpoints/road blocks increase the transaction cost of businesses and lowers the productivity of ordinary civilians because of loss of time, fuel, etc. Last year the closure of the airport for three months at night-time has cost businesses such as airlines and export trade heavily.

With an inflation of 35 percent, why is the public not turning against the government? Is it perhaps the psychological boost or the 'feel good factor' from the gains in the Northern battlefront? In comparison to the situation in 2000 when economic problems were compounded by battlefield reverses, in the current phase, military successes are sustaining the public support in spite of a high cost of living. The Government claims that the people have to pay this cost in order to eradicate terrorism and the people are buying this argument, thinking perhaps this is the right way to go. A majority of the Sinhalese population feels that the Government will capture Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu but experts suggest that the Government's advance will be anything but smooth. Capturing LTTE area will not necessarily lead to ceasing LTTE activities. The approach that Sri Lanka faces a terrorist problem will not ensure a solution to the actual ethnic problem. Dr. Rajan Hoole of the UTHR-J wonders if the government and the forces will be able to ensure stability and human rights in the North and East.

by Tejal Chandan